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ABSTRACT 
 
We propose a scheme for quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with dual-rail displaced 
photon states. Displaced single photon states carry bit value of code which may be extracted 
while coherent states carry nothing and they only provide inconclusive outcome. Developed 
QKD protocol works with experimental attendant noise to observe presence of malicious Eve. 
Pulses with large amplitudes unlike conventional QKD relying on faint laser pulses are used 
that may approximate it to standard telecommunication communication and may show 
resistance to eavesdropping even in settings with high attenuation. Information leakage to the 
eavesdropper is determined from comparison of output distribution of the outcomes with ideal 
one that is defined by two additional inaccessible to nobody, saving for who sends the pulses, 
parameters. Robustness to some possible eavesdropping attacks is shown.          
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1. Introduction 
 
     The quantum key distribution protocol provides a way for two remote parties (traditionally 
known as Alice and Bob) to share a secure random key by communicating over an open 
channel [1-5]. The two users have two kinds of communication channels at their disposal. 
One is a classical public channel that may be eavesdropped by any unauthorized person but 
cannot be modified and the second is a quantum channel. The quantum channel is used to 
transmit the secret key while the classical public channel is used to check possible presence of 
eavesdropping and to send the encoded message. Quantum mechanics ensures that any 
activities of potential eavesdroppers can be detected. If Alice and Bob are sure in security of 
their key, they finally process the obtained key (the raw key) to produce a much safer key (the 
final key) using classical methods of error correction and privacy amplification [6,7].  
     At present, there is a large collection of variations of QKD protocols [8]. Let us mention a 
few, chosen somewhat arbitrarily. The most famous QKD protocol is the four state scheme, 
usually referred to as the Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. In this protocol, the 
transmission of a single photon randomly polarized along four directions is used [2]. The key 
idea of the BB84 protocol is that simultaneous measurements of noncommuting observables 
for a single photon in two conjugate bases are forbidden by quantum mechanics. In order 
words, the measurement of one observable made on the eigenstate of another observable 
inevitably introduces disturbance to the state. Eve has no any knowledge about the state sent 
by Alice and therefore she is forced on average half the time to introduce a disturbance into 
the state that can be detected as a bit error. One of possible variation of BB84 consists in 
using quantum systems of dimension greater than 2 [9]. Most of the existing schemes use an 
imperfect single-photon source since a single photon resource is difficult to produce 
experimentally, usually weak pulses were used in practice [10]. Such an implementation, in 
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general case, may subject to the photon number-splitting attack [11]. To deal with imperfect 
source of single photons, many interesting methods was proposed [12] involving the decoy-
state method [13]. 
     Another possible way to implement secret sharing coding is based on use of pairs of 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) correlated photons [3]. A communication protocol based on 
entangled pairs of qubits is presented in [14]. A system, which is conceptually the simplest, is 
the use of nonorthogonal quantum states [5]. Indeed, two nonorthogonal states cannot be 
distinguished unambiguously without perturbation only at the cost of some losses [15]. 
Initially, the two state protocol [5] was proposed to implement using interference of two 
classical pulses that is fragile under influence of decoherence.     
     Instead of use of single photons or weak coherent pulses, it is interesting idea any 
nonclassical field states are useful for quantum information processing and communication 
that was demonstrated on example of QKD with squeezed light [16]. Here, we propose to 
make use of nonclassical properties of the displaced single photon states to share secret 
coding between two sides. Displacement operator imposes additional varied degree of 
freedom on a photon state. According to studied model of QKD the inputs are the dual-rail 
displaced states rather than single photon 1  unlike [2]. In order words, carriers in the model 
are the optical pulses with different large amplitudes as in usual classical communication. The 
developed protocol of QKD is free of problems connected with interference. Let us also 
mention the displaced single photon state was experimentally generated in [17]. A possibility 
to conditionally generate displaced entangled states via nonlinear interaction of powerful 
pump beam with a crystal with 
 2  nonlinearity was proposed in [18]. Another interesting 
application of the displaced states is the protocol of dense coding [19].    
                                                                           
2. Implementation of QKD with dual-rail displaced states   
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     In developed protocol, Alice prepares two ensembles of displaced states with different 
amplitudes of displacement (in general case, we deal with four states two of which are 
nonclassical). Every of the ensembles consists of only basis states, namely either product of 
displaced single photon and vacuum states or product of two displaced vacuum states (a two 
qubit system has four computational basis states denoted 00 , 10 , 01 , and 11 ) but not 
their superpositions in the two-dimensional space. Basis elements 00 , 10  with different 
amplitudes of displacement are not orthogonal to each other. Performance of the protocol is 
based on use of nonclassical properties of the displaced single photon states. On the receiving 
side, Bob has to distinguish between two displaced single photons 10  with different 
amplitudes for each incoming carrier. Since displaced single photon states are non-
orthogonal, Bob cannot do it with certainty and he sometimes fails to extract correct outcome 
but once it gives one (this means that he performs a test by means of a generalized 
measurement known POVM [20]). Proposed protocol corresponds a communication channel 
known as a binary erasure channel with possible outcomes 0 , 1, and ?  (?  means 
inconclusive result) as in B-92 protocol [5]. For example, if Alice sends a 0 , Bob may get 
either a 0  or an inconclusive result, but never 1, saving for a case of Eve eavesdropping the 
communication channel sends herself 1 by mistake. Inconclusive outcomes are also provided 
by sending of 00  or the same coherent states with different amplitudes.    
     Now, let us present mathematical details of the protocol. The states   0,0
^
 D  and 
 1,1
^
 D  are the displaced vacuum and one-photon states, respectively, where  
^
D  is 
the displacement operator [18, 19]. A quantum system prepared by Alice is given by density 
matrix   
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21
2
1
2
1
  ,                                                                                                                      (1a) 
where  
'
1
'
1
'
11111  PP  ,                                                                                                    (1b) 
'
2
'
2
'
22222  PP  ,                                                                                                  (1c) 
( 1
'
11  PP  and 1
'
22  PP ) with dual-rail displaced states defined as    
21121
,0,1  i ,                                                                                                              (2a) 
2112
'
1 ,0,0  i ,                                                                                                            (2b) 
2111122
,0,1  i ,                                                                                                           (2c) 
2112
'
2 ,0,0  i ,                                                                                                            (2d) 
where in general case 1  . The parameters  , 1  and 1P ,
'
1P , 2P , and 
'
2P , respectively, are 
Alice’s secret ones and they are hidden from both Bob and Eve. The states 
121
  and 
122
  
may carry bit values of the coding ( 0  or 1, respectively). We are going to call the states as bit 
ones. Since the states 
12
'
1  and 
12
'
2  do not carry any information to Bob, we call them 
disguised ones.                                       
     Bob prepares its measurement system as it is shown in Fig. 1 to extract some useful 
information from the states obtained from Alice. The measurement system involves a 
balanced beam splitter 1
^
B  described by the following matrix  







1
1
2
1
1
i
i
B .                                                                                                                        (3) 
The outcome of the beam splitter (3) is the following 
 
212112
1
^
1 2,102,01
2
1
 iiiB  ,                                                                      (4a) 
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2112
'
1
^
1 2,00  iB  ,                                                                                                        (4b) 
 
212112
2
^
1 12,002,1
2
1
 iiiB  ,                                                                      (4c) 
2112
'
1
^
1 02,0  iB  .                                                                                                        (4d) 
To achieve a discrimination of the outcomes (4a)-(4d) with off-the-shelf photon counters that 
can only differentiate between zero and more photons ( n,...,2,1 ), the simplest approach for 
Bob is to split them by two beam splitters as shown in Fig. 1. Consider a partial case of such a 
discrimination of a single photon and coherent state as it is shown in Fig. 2 (a, b). The beam 
splitter transforms a coherent state 2,0 i  to the product of two coherent states 
2121
,0,002,0  iii  , while a single photon to a superposition state 
  
121212
01102110  . If both detectors 1D  and 2D  register any photons, we know 
we detected a state 2,0 i . On the contrary, if either 1D  or 2D  does not click, we can 
assume with almost unity probability that was a single photon, especially in the case of large 
value of  . The same is applicable to discrimination of all states in Eqs. (4a)-(4d). It follows 
from Eqs. (4a)-(4d) that three simultaneous clicks by detectors 41 DD   in Fig. 1 are 
unambiguously identified as bit values ( 0  and 1, respectively). All other events with three 
clicks less or more are identified as inconclusive outcome. 
     Given QKD protocol works as follows. Alice injects light in one of the four states (4a)-
(4d) into a communication channel in random sequence. Via the use of a proposed detection 
system (Fig. 1) triggered on some photon statistics, presence of three simultaneous clicks in 
output Bob’s statistics heralds the extraction of bit information. All the carries sent by Alice 
are numbered. Bob measures the incoming pulses to establish a one-to-one correspondence 
between sent and received pulses. At the point, where Bob may successfully extract bit value 
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(three simultaneous clicks), they get perfectly correlated results. Bob has only to declare a 
number of the corresponding pulse (but not its result). All the rest inconclusive outcomes are 
discarded by Bob. This allows for Alice and Bob to share mutual information  
          2211222221121122112 logloglog, pPpPpPpPpPpPpPpPBAI  ,                      (5) 
where   021 15.0 Ppp   are the conditional probabilities for Bob to obtain a bit result 
provided that Alice sent 
121
  and 
122
 , respectively, and 
        2220 exp1exp22exp  P , where  0P  is the probability to register 
three clicks less provided that the states were 
21
2,01 i , 
21
12,0 i . To simplify 
calculations in future consideration, we suppose 1  . Although, one should note the QKD 
protocol admits a possibility 1   and even more Alice may vary amplitudes of every sent 
carriers provided that the phase relations of dual states remain constant. Given possibility may 
prevent the protocol from Eve’s eavesdropping in the case of possible more skilful attacks 
that beyond our consideration. It is natural to assume that Alice delivers states 
121
  and 
122
  with equal probabilities PPP  21  that allows for Alice and Bob to share 1 bit of 
mutual information.          
     As well known, quantum cryptography cannot prevent eavesdropping, but any 
eavesdropping attempt can be detected by the legitimate users of the communication channel. 
This is related with that fact that eavesdropping affects the quantum state of the information 
carriers and results in an abnormal error rate. Therefore, before Bob publicly declares the 
number (but not the result of his measurement) where he successfully extracted a bit value, 
Alice and Bob have to test their communication channel by sacrificing a part of their data 
sufficient to estimate output distributions. Actually, there are three parameters to judge about 
possible presence of eavesdropping in the subset. The main such a parameter is the output 
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distribution of bit and inconclusive outcomes given in the case of absence of eavesdropping 
by  
      001
)(
0 1
4
1
4
P
P
P
P
P Out  ,                                                                                     (6a) 
      0102
)(
1 1
4
1
4
P
P
P
P
P Out  ,                                                                                    (6b) 
)(
1
)(
0
)(
? 1
OutOutOut PPP  .                                                                                                        (6c) 
Note that neither Bob nor malicious Eve cannot know the output distribution of the bit and 
inconclusive outcomes since the parameters PPP  21  and   are chosen by Alice according 
to her own strategy and they are hidden from other participants. Eve can only listen to the talk 
between Alice and Bob through a public channel but she cannot correct the output distribution 
shared by Alice and Bob. Another important parameter whose change testifies presence of 
Eve in the communication channel is that which we call disguised probability dP  being 
frequency of appearance of bit outcome while Alice sent one of the disguised states. The 
disguised states cannot give bit outcome only inconclusive outcome. The disguised 
probability dP  has to be equal exactly zero in ideal case of absence of eavesdropping. Finally, 
Alice and Bob also may compare bit values of the chosen subset. For example, it is evident 
that single photon is not detected in mode 2  if Alice sends a state 
121
  and vise versa. Thus, 
these parameters may serve as indicators of presence or absence of the eavesdropping in the 
communication channel. If the parameters do not coincide with ideal then eavesdropping is 
detected and transmission is aborted. One should note it is possible directly to check a 
communication channel not sacrificing any subset of data. Indeed, Bob call corresponding 
number of his bit outcome and is it sufficient for Alice to estimate output distribution and 
disguised probability to compare it with Bob’s. After that they can decide to take them or 
discard.      
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     Displacing a state of light can be experimentally implemented by overlapping it with a 
strong coherent state 
2,0   upon a highly reflecting beam splitter. Now, we follow a method 
of [17] used to experimentally generate a displaced single photon. We suppose that the initial 
single photon is prepared by means of conditional measurements on a biphoton generated via 
parametric down conversion. It was discussed in [17] that imperfections associated with 
experimental technique result in the photon being prepared with a substantial admixture of the 
vacuum state   00111  A , where   is the preparation efficiency. The 
preparation efficiency may accounts for the spontaneous parametric converter dark count 
events. In such an event, the quantum state in the output mode in not conditioned on that in 
used converter channel. Alice only needs to estimate the value of her preparation efficiency. 
She uses a beam splitter with arbitrary parameters T  and R  but which knows only she (T  
and R  are transmittance and reflectance, respectively) 








**
'
TR
RT
B  to overlap her prepared state A  with a strong coherent field 2,0  . Indeed, 
Alice uses two coherent fields 
2
'
22 ,0,0
1

A
 to provide outcome (1a). The output state in 
the beam splitter 'B  is calculated by applying beam splitter transformation rules. A state in the 
modes 1 and 2  is obtained if we take trace upon states in auxiliary mode 1A . The beam 
splitter acts upon the incident single photon state simply as a lossy reflector, reducing its 
efficiency by a factor 
2
R . Also, the beam splitter causes the displacement of the state A , 
producing a final statistical mixture of displaced Fock states as 
  
   '1
22
'
11111
2
'
1
22
'
11111
2'
,0,0,0,01
,1,0,1,1


TTT
TTRA


. The state 
'
A  is the state 1  (Eq. (1b)) 
provided that 
2
1 RP  ,    1
2
2 TP , T1   and 
'
1 i . The same is applicable to 
generate 2  (Eq. (1c)). Thus, unavoidable noise being in practice due to technical 
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imperfections is substantial part of the developed protocol of key distribution unlike most of 
other protocols which require ideal resource of quantum states, for example, ideal resource of 
single photons. Any of unauthorized observers may estimate preparation efficiency   but it is 
hardly possible for him to guess the reducing factor 
2
R  and all the more the values of 
parameters   and  1  that initially are known only to Alice. The additional modulation of the 
outcome of conditioned down converter gives a possibility Alice to use quantum states with 
additional secret parameters to transmit them to Bob.                           
       
3. Robustness to eavesdropping  
 
     We now analyze some of eavesdropping strategies. Note that direct measurement of 
incoming pulse does not give answer which of the four states was sent. If Eve prefers to 
measure dependence of falling field on the relative phase she may use a scheme that involves 
homodyning the signal field with a reference signal known as the local oscillator before 
photodetection. Homodyning with a reference signal of fixed phase gives the phase sensitivity 
necessary to yield the quadrature variances. A measurement of quadrature components shows 
that statistical characteristics   ,1,1,0,0
^^
aa  are equal. Then, Eve may not be 
aware of which type of state she has (bit or disguised) if she measured a definite value of the 
quadrature component (  ,1,1,0,0
^^
XX  ).             
     The most practical eavesdropping strategy may be intercept-resend attack. Eve intercepts 
the quantum carrier on its way from Alice and Bob and performs the same measurement as it 
does Bob, namely, using a beam splitter 1B  (Eq. (3)). After the measurement, Eve sends to 
Bob another quantum carrier in one of the four states (2a)-(2d), looking at her outcome and 
following some chosen strategy. Eve’s strategy may be the following. If Eve obtains bit value 
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then she again sends the corresponding bit state either 
121
  or 
122
 , respectively. If Eve 
detects inconclusive outcome then she is trying to guess possible Alice’s signal and to 
masquerade as Alice. Consider it in detail on example of the state 1 . Assume that Eve 
resends a state 
121
  with probability ''1P  and 
12
'
1  with probability 
''
2P  ( 1
''
2
''
1  PP ) in the 
case of her inconclusive output. Then, Eve affects output probability distribution as 
    481 ''1'1''110 PPPPP OutE  , where we even neglected  '0 P , where '  is the amplitude of 
the displaced states that Eve creates. In general, Eve may choose 
''
1P  in such a way that 
 Out
EP0  
was almost similar to  OutP0  (Eq. (6a)) due to the contribution 4
''
1
'
1 PP  (she may sometimes 
guess correct distribution  OutP0 ). But it happens at the expense of nonzero disguised 
probability 04''1
'
1  PPPd  thus giving Eve’s presence away. The more 
''
1P  Eve chooses the 
more disguised probability dP  is observed.  
     Eve may choose more tricky strategy of eavesdropping. Assume that Eve resends a 
corresponding disguised state either 
12
'
1  or 
12
'
2  if she has got corresponding inconclusive 
output but she resends the following states  
 
2
'
1
'
2
'
1
'
121
,1,0,0,1
2
1
 iii  ,                                                                    (7a) 
 
2
'
1
1
'
1
2
'
1
1
'
1122
,1,0,0,1
2
1
 iii  ,                                                                   (7b) 
instead of 
121
  or 
122
 , respectively, if she obtains a bit outcome. Such a strategy gives 
correct output distribution between Alice and Bob (6a)-(6c) since  
2
'
1121
^
1 2,01 iB                                                                                                          (8a)  
12,0
1
'
122
^
1 iB  ,                                                                                                        (8b)      
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saving for difference between  0P ,  10 P ,  '0 P  and  '10 P . Then, Eve may share 1 bit of 
information with Alice and Bob. Nevertheless, such method of eavesdropping has a weak 
place. The states 
121
  and 
122
  are sensitive to influence of decoherence. It is impossible 
to keep the phase relation in the states 
121
 , 
122
  stable when Eve and Bob are separated 
by large distance since quantum coherence is fragile under unavoidable interaction with 
environments. The decoherence effects for a state described by the density operator can be 
induced by solving the master equation when it is possible exactly calculate the coherence 
parameter and amplitude damping. Calculations of the parameters for the states (7a) and (7b) 
are beyond our consideration. Nevertheless, we may conjecture that Bob obtains a mixture of 
the states with density matrix  
        '
22
''
11
''
22
''
11
''
1 ,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,15.0  iiii   by analogy with 
coherent states with different amplitudes. Such a density matrix introduces error in output 
distribution    81 '0)(0 PPP OutE  ,    81 '10)(1 PPP OutE  , and )(1)(0)(? 1 OutEOutEOutE PPP   on 
compared with Eqs. (6a)-(6c) that can be observed. It is possible to show that, when Eve 
eavesdrops on a fraction 1  of the transmissions, then the final Alice-Bob distribution  
     4121 0
)(
1
)(
0  PPPP
Out
E
Out
E   and 
)(
1
)(
0
)(
? 1
Out
E
Out
E
Out
E PPP  , provided that 
     '10'00  PPP   is performed, may approach ideal one given by Eqs. (6a)-(6c) at the 
expense of 1 bit less of mutual information (      BEIEAI ,, ).   
     Let us consider another realistic strategy (beam splitting attack) where Eve tries to 
eavesdrop the transmitted signals without observing. Assume that Eve splits both states using 
her two beam splitters both described by the matrix 








** TR
RT
BE , where T  and R satisfy the condition 1
22
 RT . Then, the output states 
are the following 
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     
21
212
2
1
1
,0,1,0,0
,0,0,0,10,00,1,0,1
21
211
1
^
1
1
^
21
^
EE
EEE
E
E
E
RiRTiTR
RiRTiTTiBBiU




, (9a) 
     
212
2
1
1
,0,0,0,00,00,0,0,0
211
1
^
1
1
^
21
^
EEE
E
E
E RiRTiTiBBiU   , (9b) 
where 1E  and 2E  are the Eve’s modes. As 1R , Eve may neglect contribution of second 
term in Eq. (9a) for her estimations. The same is applicable to the components of 2 . The 
best that Eve can do in the case is to choose the parameters of her beam splitters such the 
condition RT 
 
to be performed. Then, the output Alice-Bob statistics
   41 0
2)(
0 TPTPP
Out
E  ,    41 0
2)(
1 TPTPP
Out
E  , 
)(
1
)(
0
)(
? 1
Out
E
Out
E
Out PPP   approaches 
sufficiently close to ideal (6a)-(6c), since 1
2
T . Alice and Bob compare their statistics and 
take it as correct, after that Bob announces the corresponding number where he has got bit 
value. Eve also listens to their talk and she needs only to distinguish two states 
21
,0,0
EE
RiR   and 
21
11 ,0,0 EE RRi   from each other to have an access to the coding. It 
can be done as it does Bob with help of the balanced beam splitter (3) 
 
21
^
1 2,00,0,0
21
RiRiRB
EE
   and  
21
111
^
1 02,0,0,0
21
RiRRiB
EE
  . 
Nevertheless, such strategy does not give Eve sufficient access to coding since a probability 
   112exp 22  TPvac   not to register any photons and distinguish between 
21
,0,0
EE
RiR   and 
21
11 ,0,0 EE RRi  , respectively, is high. Eve registers nothing and 
she loses any information about coding shared by Alice and Bob. Thus, she may only has 
access to 01  vacP  bits of mutual information. Moreover, Eve does not know exactly 
values of   to try to define optimal parameters for her beam splitting attack. This 
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consideration gives estimations for Alice’s amplitude   to satisfy condition   01 22  T  
for 1
2
T .    
     Now, consider the case when Eve attempts to gain some information on each signal sent 
by Alice, while minimizing the damage to the state. This strategy can be realized by making 
the information carrier interact unitarily with a probe, and then letting it proceed to Bob, in 
slightly modified state. Eve may store her probe and decides which type of measurement to 
perform on her probe only after Alice and Bob shared their coding. To do it Eve supplies her 
probe in a known initial state g , and then the combined system may evolve as  
  111
^
egU E  ,                    2'1'1
^
egU E  ,                                                      (10a) 
  322
^
egU E  ,                    2'22
^
egU E  ,                                                    (10b) 
where 
21121
,0,1 EEE i  , 2112
'
1 ,0,0 EEE i  , 2111122 ,0,1 EEE i   , and 
211112
'
2 ,0,0 EEE i   . Evolution is unitary (Eve can to make some Hamiltonian which 
generates it) and scalar product is conserved. Then, it imposes the following condition
      
 21
2
2
1
222
31
1
1
exp
EE
EE
i
i
ee





 ,                                                 (11a)
    
EE
EE
i
i
ee






1
2
1
222
41 exp ,                                                          (11b) 
    
EE
EE
i
i
ee
1
2
1
222
23 exp





 ,                                                          (11c) 
    2122224 exp EEee   .                                                                          (11d) 
The composite system is a direct product of the corresponding states if overlaps 1
2
ji ee  (
41, ji ). After sending the modified carrier to Bob, Eve remains with her probe. The 
probes are not orthogonal to each other. The idea of Eve is to cause minimal damage to the 
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information carrier and to obtain as much as possible information. To hide her presence Eve 
may try to guess Alice’s parameters E   and E1   to provide performance of condition
     EE PPP 1000   . But overlapping 31 ee  (Eq. (11a)) becomes almost unit (
131 ee ) for the case of E   and E1  , respectively. Since the states 1e  and 3e  
are not orthogonal and even more their overlapping is sufficiently large, Eve cannot 
distinguish them exactly and, as consequence, she may share only 1 bit less of mutual 
information.         
  
4. Discussion and conclusion  
 
     Optical quantum cryptography is based on the use of single photon Fock states. 
Unfortunately, these states are difficult to realize experimentally. Nowadays, practical 
implementations rely on faint laser pulses, in which the photon number distribution obeys 
Poisson statistics or entangled photon pair. Both the possibilities suffer from a small 
probability of generating more than one photon or photon pair at the same time. For large 
losses in the quantum channel, small fractions of these multiphotons can have important 
consequences on the security of the key. We propose not to pursue goal of creating ideal 
resource of single photon states and make use of really existing resource of single photons. 
The way to create pseudo-single-photon states is the generation of photon pairs and the of use 
one photon as a trigger for the other one. The conditional photon generation by parametric 
down converter is connected with imperfections associated with experimental technique 
results [17]. Nevertheless, if we modulate such a statistical mixture by coherent state on a 
beam splitter we produce displaced photon states that are applicable for proposed QKD 
protocol. Even more, developed QKD protocol based on use of dual rail displaced states 
works with experimental attendant noise used to observe possible presence of malicious Eve. 
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By the way, such a modulation enables Alice to use two additional parameters inaccessible to 
nobody, namely, her initial distributions between displaced single photon and vacuum and 
amplitudes of her fields which she may change. Such QKD deals with optical pulses as 
carriers unlike quantum QKD with a single photon that approximates it to standard 
telecommunication communication. With the availability of source of quantum states for the 
communication, the success of quantum cryptography essentially depends on the ability to 
detect single photons. In principle, this can be achieved using a variety of techniques, for 
instance, photomultipliers, avalanche photodiodes, multichannel plates, and superconducting 
Josephson junctions. In our case, we need only to distinguish between a single photon and 
optical pulses involving multiphoton states that can be done by means of commercial 
detectors as it is shown in Fig. 1 and 2.  
     Note another peculiarity of the proposed scheme. Consider optical fiber version of a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer made out of two symmetric beam splitters connected to each other, 
with one phase modulator in each arm. This interferometer combined with a single-photon 
source and photon-counting detectors can be used for quantum cryptography provided that 
phase shift is kept constant. Although such a scheme may be perfect on an optical table, it is 
impossible to keep the path difference between two modes stable for a distance more. If we 
take states similar to 7(a) and 7(b) as carriers, then the same problems appear as the states 7(a) 
and 7(b) are the displaced analogues of a singe photon in superposition state that takes 
simultaneously two modes. Nevertheless, although we call used states as dual rail displaced 
photon number states, it is evident that Alice can do some delay between the pulses in 
different modes and send them through the same optical fiber one after the other where they 
may experience the same phase shift in environmentally sensitive part of the system. This 
enables to conserve phase relations of incoming pulses on output at Bob side if he also makes 
the same delay for first pulse before to combine two pulses on the beam splitter. Detailed 
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analysis of influence of decoherence on phase relations is subject of future investigation and 
is beyond the consideration. Let us only mention that use of pulses with large amplitudes 
unlike conventional schemes of the quantum cryptography may show resistance to 
eavesdropping even in settings with high attenuation. It is also useful to note that optical 
scheme of two-state protocol [5] can be implemented using interference between a 
macroscopic bright pulse and a dim pulse with less than one photon on average [5]. Proposed 
optical scheme is not one of Mach-Zehnder interferometer and, as consequence, it is free of 
interference effect and of attendant problems. Remarkably, that this approach is robust against 
loss of the single photon, and inefficiency of the photodetectors. Those factors will cause the 
corresponding photodetectors to be silent, and such cases can simply be discarded. Therefore, 
this only affects the output distributions and has to be taken into account in real case.                           
     In conclusion, we proposed a new QKD protocol that is based on use of nonclassical 
properties of the displaced single photon states. Given protocol works as a binary erasure 
channel also as in a B-92 protocol [5]. This is sole possible resemblance with a B-92 protocol 
but not more. Our analysis involves study of only restricted number of possible eavesdropping 
attacks and show that the protocol is secure under them. 
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List of figures  
Figure 1 
Schematic representation of QKD based on dual-rail displaced states. Alice prepares her dual-
rail displaced state and sends it to Bob who has a chance extract bit value if it was the bit state. 
Otherwise Bob obtains inconclusive outcome and discards it. Bob announces a number where 
he successfully got bit value only if a procedure of check of eavesdropping showed absence 
of it.       
Figure 2(a,b) 
Example how to distinguish between a coherent state 2,0  and a single photon 1 . The 
coherent state mainly results in registration of photons by two detectors save for small failure 
probability to register only one click. Single photon gives always one click. The more 
amplitude of the displaced state we use the less the failure probability.     
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Figure 2 (a, b) 
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